This paper investigates dynamic implications of pension contributions and intergenerational transfers under pay-as-you-go system. By incorporating interest groups' contributions to social security and subsidies from the national government into the conventional overlapping generations model, the model explores a long-run property of public spending, social security contributions and economic growth. The good economic condition will not necessarily lead to large public spending. The public good is too little in terms of the static efficiency (or compared with private consumption) but may be too much or too little in terms of the dynamic efficiency (or as the steady state level). We also examine the normative role of taxes (and subsidies) on consumption and pension contributions.
Introduction
There has been much attention on the long-run macroeconomic and intergenerational redistribution effects of public pension reform. It is well recognized that pay-as-you-go system is not attractive when the rate of economic growth declines.
However, the movement from pay-as-you-go financing to full funding is hard in terms of intergenerational equity, just as reducing the public debt-GDP ratio is hard.
Researchers have investigated mechanisms under which a decentralized economy might successfully change from public pay-as-you-go pension scheme to private fully funded.
There are several important attempts to investigate such pension reform. The standard analysis is of simulation studies using overlapping generations models based on Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) . Cifuentes and Valdes-Prieto (1997) among others offer the output from a simulation model that describes the transition in detail, year by year. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a,b) present a useful survey of various theories of social security 1 . Hatta and Oguchi (1999) develop the simulation study on Japanese pension reforms.
Because most of the social security contributions from current workers goes directly to fund benefits for current retirees in the unfunded system, the social security system does not significantly increase government savings. Therefore, to the extent that social security reduces private saving, it will also tend to shrink the total amount of saving in the economy. However, time-series and cross-country estimates are inconsistent and fraught with conceptual difficulties. They offer little additional information on the relationship between social security and saving. This is partly because the actual system may not be regarded as the pure pay-as-you-go financing, especially in Japan.
It is true that pay-as-you-go and fully funded systems are two representative pension schemes, and hence it is useful to investigate and compare long-run implications of both systems in terms of intergenerational equity. However, the actual public pension system is not exactly the pay-as-you-go system in some countries. In particular, an important feature of Japan's system is that Japan's government put a lot of money as a subsidy to the social security account from the general fiscal account. (See Takayama 1998) . One reason why Japan's government is in huge deficit is that its subsidies to the social security account is large. There is no direct link between contributions and benefits as in the standard unfunded system. Such a subsidy is soft in terms of intergenerational transfers, as it allows the elderly generation to spend more than they contributed at the younger age and it is always easy to get support politically.
In the analysis of long-run pension system the formulation of two relevant variables, social security benefits and contributions, would crucially affect the result.
Actually, the benefit may well be regarded as exogenous and fixed for a long time. For example, in Japan the replacement ratio has been maintained at about 65% since mid-1970s. On the contrary, it seems more plausible to make contributions endogenous when investigating the long-run property of the system. The Japanese government adjusts old-age benefits and contributions based on the newest estimation of future population changes. There is little room to revise (or reduce) the replacement ratio due to the political pressure of existing old-age generations. Thus, the main political issue is to what degree the contributions should be raised.
We assume that the old-age benefit in real terms, which is represented by the replacement ratio, is a policy variable and hence exogenously given, while social security contributions are effectively determined by interest groups. All relevant interest groups (such as employees in the private sector, civil servants of the central government, local of a defined-benefit social security system. government employees, self-employed, firms' managers and so on) may agree with an increase in contributions. Namely, when facing fiscal crises of public sector, every interest group generally agrees with the increase in contributions since it would alleviate the fiscal crisis by reducing subsidies from the government's general account.
But it would not necessarily imply that each interest group is willing to accept increases in its own contributions or cuts in its own privilege within the pension system. They would not easily agree with the allocation of increases in total contributions. This phenomenon may be analyzed using a concept of non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. This paper examines both intragenerational and intergenerational conflicts under the pay-as-you-go system with fiscal subsidies, which are provided by the central government. By incorporating voluntary contributions of interest groups to social security at Nash conjectures, our model can exhibit dynamic properties of pension contributions and capital accumulation. The larger the concern for public spending, the deeper accumulation of capital would likely occur. Capital accumulation and pension contributions usually grow at the same time. An increase in benefits (or an increase in the replacement ratio) will reduce capital accumulation. However, a good economic condition of providing the public good will not necessarily lead to high economic growth at the second best solution. Namely, the public sector does not have a strong incentive to raise the productivity of providing public spending. The public good is too little in terms of the static efficiency (or compared with private consumption) but may be too much or too little in terms of the dynamic efficiency (or as the steady state level). Consumption taxes or a subsidy to social security contributions would always be desirable. If the government can control the replacement ratio so as to realize the modified golden rule, it would attain the dynamic efficiency.
Section 2 presents the analytical model of overlapping generations. Section 3 investigates dynamic properties of the model using a Cobb-Douglas example. Section 4 considers long-run implications of changes in some policy factors. Section 5 examines some normative aspects of public pension policy. This section also derives optimal taxes on consumption or subsidies on pension contributions. Finally section 6 concludes the paper.
Model

Analytical Framework
We develop a standard model of two-period overlapping generations. An agent (or an interest group) i of generation t born at time t, considers itself young in period t, old in period t+1, and dies at time t+2. When young an agent of generation t supplies one unit of labor inelastically and receives wages wt out of which the agent consumes c 1 it, provides social security contributions git, pays wages taxes τ , and saves sit. An agent receives capital income (1+rt+1)sit and pension benefits βw t+1 when old, which the agent then spends entirely on consumption c w + 1 2 it+1. There are no private bequests. rt is the rate of interest in period t. There is no population growth and each generation has n identical individuals (or interest groups).
Thus, a member i of generation t faces the following budget constraints:
where βw is old age benefits. β is the replacement ratio, old age benefits per average current wage income. The target contribution level is set by the government but each interest group can reduce its own contribution by conducting political activities. Thus, g i may be regarded as voluntary provision of social security contributions.
His lifetime utility function is written as
where G is benefits from public spending, which is a pure public good and beneficial only for the younger age.
The budget constraint of pay-as-you-go social security account is written as where q is the marginal (and average) cost of providing the public good. Equations (4) and (5) summarize the social security account with fiscal subsidies from the government general account. Due to the subsidies, there is no direct link between young-age contributions and old-age benefits unlike the standard pay-as-you-go system. A subsidy from the general account of the central government makes the public pension budget constraint "soft". In Japan revenues of the national taxes are used for providing pension benefits to current generation.
Since there is no direct link between contributions and benefits in the above system, each interest group does not have an incentive to paying contributions unless we incorporate the benefits from public spending, G. Introducing G into the utility function is one of plausible explanations why the younger generation would like to contribute to public pension.
Substituting (5) into (4), we may derive the overall budget constraint of the public sector as
which implies that an increase in pension contributions would result in an increase in public spending so long as tax and replacement rates are fixed.
From (1)(2) and (6) As in the standard model of voluntary provision of a pure public good, we will exclude binding contracts or cooperative behavior between the agents and will explore the outcome of non-cooperative Nash behavior 2 .
In this Cournot-Nash model, the right hand side of (7) means "real" income,
, which contains actual disposable income including current old age benefits, From (6) and (7) we have
Namely, add (7) from i=1 to n and use (6). Then we will get (8).
, the third term in the right hand side of (8), captures externalities from n-1 other persons' contributions within the same generation. 
since n is exogenously given.
In an equilibrium agents can save by holding physical capital. We have
The system may be summarized by these two equations.
where E( ) is the expenditure function, which minimizes the left hand side of (9) ( 1 7 ) where
. It is also easy to show G"< 0 .
G and K always move to the same direction, which implies a positive relation between G and K. Under the interdependence between the pension benefits and public spending, formulated as (4) and (5), an increase in public spending (or pension fund contributions) is consistent with economic growth. An increase in capital stock raises real income, stimulating the demand for public goods. In order to have a larger amount of public goods, it is necessary to reduce the subsidy from the general account to the pension account. Thus, the agent is willing to pay more pension contributions, inducing larger public spending. In general we have the substitution effect as well. Namely, an increase in K raises 1/(1+r), the price of , inducing a substitution from to G. This effect also produces larger public goods. Hence, considering (10)(11)(12-1) and (12-3), (13) may be rewritten as
. (20) 
is positive since θ α > and hence θ α n n + > 1
. Thus, (21) is positive.
The stability condition is
Or, we have
is necessary for the stability condition (22). We know that . We 
α 3 (the preference for public spending), it is more likely that the system would be stable.
Comparative Statics
From (13) and (14) the steady state equilibrium may be summarized by the following two equations.
Totally differentiating (23) and (24) 
Ω Ω
The effect of an increase in β or q on U is generally ambiguous. See Table 1 .
By setting (25-1) to be zero, we may implicitly derive the optimal level of β , the replacement ratio at the second best solution. An increase in β raises old-age consumption, which is desirable, while it reduces the effective income, the right-hand side of (23), which is undesirable. The sign of (25-3) is ambiguous. It should thus be stressed that an increase in q may raise welfare at the second best solution. Intuition is as follows. On the one hand, an increase in q raises private savings due to the substitution effect, which is beneficial. On the other hand, it raises the marginal cost of producing public goods which is not beneficial. The overall effect is ambiguous.
As to the effect on capital accumulation, an increase in the replacement ratio will reduce accumulation of capital. We know the sign of (25-2) becomes negative. The sign of (25-4) is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in q reduces the lifetime disposable income, producing the negative effect on capital accumulation. On the other hand, an increase in q will reduce voluntary contributions, producing more savings due to the substitution effect. This stimulates capital accumulation. Thus, the overall effect is ambiguous. In other words, an increase in the efficiency of providing the public good may not necessarily stimulate accumulation of capital and public goods. These results are summarized in Table 2 .
There may exist a conflict between the first best and second best situations when q changes; a decrease in q is desirable at the first best solution but is not always desirable at the second best solution. The public sector does not have a strong incentive to raise the productivity of providing public goods although it should benefit the economy at the first best solution.
5 Normative Aspects of Public Pension Fund
First Best
In order to investigate the normative aspect of the model, it is useful to derive the first best solution. From (1)(2)(4)(5) and (9), the feasibility condition is given as
We analyze the optimal path which would be chosen by a central planner who maximizes an intertemporal social welfare function expressed as the sum of generational utilities discounted by the social discount factor on future generations, ρ , which is between 0 and 1. 
Steady-State Public Spending
In the standard overlapping generations growth model it is well known that capital may be over-supplied in the competitive equilibrium. Capital may be too much in this model as well when the competitive steady state economy is on the inefficient path
Let us compare the steady-state levels of public spending, G* at the Nash solution, and G at the first best solution. Remember that the public good at the second best solution is independent of at point N' could be greater than G at point F. The lower the discount factor G * FB ρ and the concern with future consumption α 2 , it is more likely to have such a paradoxical case.
Optimal Tax and Subsidy Policy
Finally, let us consider some tax and subsidy policy to attain the first best economy in the long run. As to the static efficiency, consumption taxes could attain the target. When consumption taxes are not available, a subsidy to social security contributions would be equivalent to taxing the second period consumption as well as the first period consumption.
Suppose that consumption taxes , a subsidy to contributions η η 1 2 , ε and a tax on interest income µ are available. We assume that the total revenues from these taxes (or subsidies) are used for a lump-sum transfer (or tax), T
. Then, the consumer's budget constraints (1) and (2) are rewritten as The optimal consumption tax rates are uniform and positive.
As to the dynamic efficiency, intergenerational redistribution policy would be useful. Or if the government can control the replacement ratio so as to realize the modified golden rule, it would attain the dynamic efficiency. When physical capital is over-provided at the Nash equilibrium ( It would raise r*, hence depressing voluntary provision of pension contributions, which is desirable in this case. Although a subsidy to pension contributions given by (35-1) may be rationalized in terms of static efficiency, it is desirable to depress voluntary contributions using the intergenerational transfer policy when capital is over-provided in the competitive economy. In such a case an increase in the replacement ratio would be desirable.
On the contrary, when capital is under-provided ( ρ ρ − > 1 * r ), the intergenerational transfer from the old to the young such as a decease in the replacement ratio would be desirable.
Conclusion
This paper has developed a general equilibrium model of pension system in which interest groups provide a social security contribution under the assumption that a part of pension fund is financed by subsidies from the general account of national government.
We have clarified how the relevant parameters would affect dynamic properties.
We have investigated the effect of contribution externalities on welfare during the growth process where both public spending and capital move to the same direction. An increase in capital stock raises real income, stimulating the demand for public goods. In order to have a larger amount of public goods, it is necessary to raise pension contributions. Thus, the agent is willing to pay more pension contributions, inducing larger public spending. The larger public spending and capital would be likely to occur at the competitive solution.
An increase in the replacement ratio will reduce accumulation of capital although its effect on welfare is ambiguous. There may exist a conflict between the first best and decentralized situations when the efficiency of public goods changes. The public sector does not have a strong incentive to raise the productivity of providing public goods although it benefits all generations at the first best solution.
Capital may be too much in the long run when the competitive steady state economy is on the inefficient path. Also, the steady-state level of public spending may be too much in the model although it is too little compared with consumption. As to attaining the static efficiency, consumption taxes or a subsidy to social security contributions would be useful for correcting the free-riding behavior of interest groups. This is desirable even if capital is over-accumulated. If the government can control the replacement ratio so as to realize the modified golden rule, it would attain the dynamic efficiency. When capital is under-provided, the intergenerational transfer from the old to the young such as a decease in the replacement ratio would be desirable. 
